In November 2025, the original PORT3 token contract was compromised due to a vulnerability in the third-party CATERC20 standard, which had been adopted to support cross-chain compatibility. After ownership was renounced for decentralisation purposes, the contract's flawed validation logic treated the absence of an owner (represented by the value 0) as a valid condition for permissioned actions.

This led to a breach in which a malicious actor registered their own address with authorisation to mint tokens via cross-chain interaction. Exploiting this flaw, they deployed a counterfeit token on Arbitrum One and used a cross-chain call to trigger minting of 1 billion PORT3 tokens on BNB Chain, which were subsequently sold on decentralised exchanges.

Following the incident, Port3 Network initiated a token migration plan to restore ecosystem integrity. A snapshot was taken immediately after the attack, and all valid user holdings were preserved through a 1:1 token swap. To offset the excess supply minted during the exploit, 162,750,000 team-held tokens were permanently burned.

Key steps in the migration included:

• Deploying a new token contract exclusively on BNB Chain
• Distributing new tokens to affected users via batch on-chain transactions
• Working with centralised exchanges to coordinate updated listings and trading support
• Preventing the attacker from receiving new tokens or exploiting the new contract

The migration aimed to fully restore the original supply balance while maintaining continuity for existing users.